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Communication and 
Cooperation in Social 
Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic 
Review
Daniel Balliet1
Abstract
Among the most researched solutions to social dilemmas is communication. Since the 
late 1950s, it has been well known that communication enhances cooperation in social 
dilemmas. This article reports a meta-analysis of this literature (forty-five effect sizes) 
and finds a large positive effect of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas 
(d = 1.01). This effect is moderated by the type of communication, with a stronger 
effect of face-to-face discussion (d = 1.21) compared to written messages (d = 0.46). 
The communication-cooperation relationship is also stronger in larger, compared to 
smaller, group social dilemmas. Whether communication occurred before or during 
iterated dilemmas did not statistically affect the communication-cooperation effect 
size. Results are discussed according to theory and research on communication in 
social dilemmas.
Keywords
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There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and 
communication.
John Dewey
Individuals often find their interests in conflict with what is best for their relationships, 
family, work organization, community, nation, and, perhaps most abstractly, their own 
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species. These conflicts between individual and collective interest are referred to as 
social dilemmas and provide the foundation of many diverse societal problems, such 
as divorce, low wages, pollution, tax evasion, and overpopulation (Van Lange and 
Joireman 2008). Social scientists have long been working on solutions to social dilem-
mas. After roughly sixty years of research, no magic bullet has arrived in the arsenal 
for attacking such problems and resolving these conflicts. However, if there is any 
single solution that has harnessed the most support and reduced the most conflict, it 
must be communication between participants in the social dilemma.
In one of the earliest recorded studies of this effect, Deutsch (1958) found that a 
brief period of discussion prior to the social dilemma greatly improved cooperation. 
Since this seminal work, several studies have replicated the positive effect of com-
munication on cooperation in social dilemmas (Bouas and Komorita 1996; Braver and 
Wilson 1986; Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Isaac and Walker 1988; Kerr et al. 
1997; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988; Ostrom and Walker 1989; Scodel et al. 
1959). There have been several explanations for this well-established effect, including 
expectations of others’ cooperation, group identity, and norms. Interestingly, however, 
there have been relatively few reviews of this literature (for reviews, see Bicchieri 
2002; Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007; Crawford 1998), especially quantitative meta- 
analytic reviews (for an exception, see Sally 1995).
Sally (1995) published the first meta-analysis of this literature and concluded that 
communication increases cooperation by 40 percent. Sally also discovered that com-
munication exerted the strongest effect on cooperation, relative to other variables known 
to influence cooperation, such as group size, the magnitude of reward for defection, 
and group identity. Although Sally’s quantitative review is commendable, there were 
several limitations to this review. Among the most prominent of these limitations is that 
Sally didn’t conduct any moderator analyses on the communication-cooperation rela-
tionship. I address this gap in the literature and report what I believe to be the first 
meta-analysis of the communication-cooperation relationship that considers how spe-
cific study characteristics may moderate this relationship. Moderators can identify 
when communication is most important and may help address some of the underlying 
explanations for this well-established relationship. In the following, I briefly review 
social dilemmas and the communication-cooperation relationship and then discuss 
three potential moderators of that relationship.
Behavior in Social Dilemmas
Imagine being called and asked to donate money to public television. This caller has 
placed you in a social dilemma. This social dilemma has two defining properties 
(Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1994). First, it is in each indi-
vidual’s best interest to defect or free-ride in the dilemma, for example, not donate 
to public television but still watch its programs. Second, if everyone acts according to 
their own best interests, then the entire group gets a worse outcome, for example, no 
public television to watch. The public television illustration is a classic step-level 
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public goods dilemma. In the step-level public goods dilemma, a group of individuals 
makes a decision to contribute money to the public good. The amount of money allo-
cated to the public good must reach a specified level for the public good to be attained. 
Importantly, there is an impossibility of exclusion, such that anyone who does not 
contribute to public television can still watch its programs. Therefore, it is in each 
individual’s interest to keep their money and still watch public television. However, 
there will be no public television if everyone acts this way. Another related dilemma 
is the resource dilemma, which models the use of many natural resources. In this 
dilemma, several individuals have an unlimited access to a common pool of resources 
and decide how much to harvest. The resource pool may be replenishable at a fixed 
rate over time. It is in each individual’s interest to take as much as possible from the 
resource, but if everyone does this, then the resource becomes depleted and every-
one is worse off, relative to a self-restrained and sustainable harvesting approach. 
These dilemmas, in combination with the prisoner’s dilemma, are the most studied 
social dilemmas.
Of the three types of dilemmas, the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is the most studied 
dilemma, especially when considering the effects of communication on behavior in 
social dilemmas. In PD studies, two or more individuals are often simultaneously pre-
sented with a binary choice matrix. Most often, participants are set in separate rooms and 
not allowed to communicate when making their decision. The possible outcomes for an 
n-person prisoner’s dilemma including six persons are shown in Table 1. In this exam-
ple, the best individual outcome is attained by choosing to defect when the other five 
persons choose to cooperate. However, if everyone chooses to defect, then this results 
in a worse outcome, relative to when each individual chooses to cooperate. The predic-
tion delivered by rational choice theory for behavior in a single trial PD game, both 
with and without communication, is that all players should choose to defect (Hargreaves 
Heap and Varoufakis 2004). However, research has consistently shown that this predic-
tion is not supported by the data because a considerable percentage of individuals 
choose to cooperate (Sally 1995). This is especially true when individuals are allowed 
to communicate with one another prior to making their choices.
Communication and Cooperation
Early research on the prisoner’s dilemma discovered that a brief discussion prior to an 
interaction increased subsequent cooperation in the dilemma (Deutsch 1958, 1960; 
Loomis 1959). Since this seminal work, much research has examined the role of com-
munication in social dilemmas, extending the communication-cooperation relationship 
to other well-studied dilemmas, such as public goods dilemmas (Chen 1996; Chen and 
Komorita 1994; Wilson and Sell 1997) and resource dilemmas (Brechner 1977; 
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 1994). This 
research has manipulated communication in several ways, including pregame discus-
sion (Bouas and Komorita 1996; Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977), pretrial 
discussion during iterated dilemmas (Kerr et al. 1997), sending either standardized or 
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open-ended messages (Chen and Komorita 1994; Betz 1991), continuous communica-
tion during the dilemma (Isaac and Walker 1988), discussion among subgroup 
members (Braver and Wilson 1986), e-mails (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998), and 
Internet chat groups (Zheng et al. 2009). One resounding conclusion emerges from 
this literature: opportunities to communicate with other participants in the dilemma 
increase cooperative behavior. Several explanations for the effect of communication 
include a better understanding of the game, increasing expectations of cooperation, 
enhancing group identity, and generating norms of cooperation (Kerr et al. 1997). 
However, research has identified group identity and norms as the most likely explana-
tions (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988). More recently, however, Kerr et al. 
(1997) has cast doubt on the group identity explanation and forwarded norms as the 
mostly likely alternative. Given the amount of research generated on this topic over 
the past sixty years, it is interesting that only one systematic quantitative review has 
been conducted.
Sally’s (1995) meta-analysis (1958-1992), however, included a few notable limita-
tions. First, this article primarily considered research on the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Second, Sally didn’t consider a moderator analysis of the effect size distribution. Of 
course, it is important to understand the magnitude of the communication-cooperation 
effect, but it is equally, if not more, important to also understand the conditions when 
communication is more strongly or weakly related to cooperation. While Sally’s work 
is respectable, the present study addresses the limitations of that article and extends 
the findings to the current state of the literature. Indeed, there have been many pub-
lished works on the effect of communication since Sally’s original article. However, 
the most novel contribution of this meta-analysis is to test for several moderators of 
the communication-cooperation effect size.
Moderators of the Communication-Cooperation Relationship
There are several potential moderators of the communication-cooperation effect size. 
Examining these moderators will provide insight regarding when communication is 
most effective in enhancing cooperation. Specifically, this study considers the moder-
ating influence of three study characteristics: (1) the type of communication medium, 
(2) if the communication occurs prior to the dilemma compared to during the dilemma, 
and (3) the size of the group facing the dilemma.
Table 1. A Six-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
   Number of 
   people choosing 
   to cooperate
 0 1  2  3  4  5  6
Defect 4 8 12 16 20 24 —
Cooperate — 0  4  8 12 16 20
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Type of communication. Most generally, communication has been manipulated in 
social dilemmas as face-to-face discussion or sending written messages, either in the 
form of notes or via computer. Interestingly, there has been little work that systemati-
cally compares these two types of communication. The few studies conducted on this 
topic have resulted in inconsistent findings. Some research finds that face-to-face dis-
cussion increases cooperation, relative to email or written messages (Bos et al. 2009; 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998; Lev-On, Chavez, and Bicchieri 2009; Rocco 1998; 
Rocco and Warglien 1996). However, other work finds that there is little to no differ-
ence between these two types of communication (Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2002; 
Bochet and Putterman 2009; Zheng et al. 2008, 2009). A meta-analysis is useful in 
resolving these inconsistent findings.
Precommunication versus continued communication. Not only do research methods 
vary in communication medium, but also at what time the communication occurs. In 
the standard dilemma without communication, participants are separated by rooms or 
cubicles and asked to make simultaneous decisions in the dilemma without communica-
tion. The social dilemma might occur only once or the dilemma can be repeated several 
times. This is typically the baseline condition when examining the effect of communica-
tion. In the communication condition, participants are either allowed to communicate 
(1) prior to the first trial with no subsequent communication; (2) prior to each trial, but 
no communication while making the decision; or (3) allowed communication before 
the first trail and unrestricted communication during all trials.
Again, there are inconsistent findings on the effect of pregame communication and 
continuous communication. Some studies find that after communication is removed 
there remains a strong effect of communication (Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann 
2001; Radlow and Weidner 1966). In these studies, communication is allowed either 
before the dilemma or during the first several trials of the dilemmas. The results sug-
gest that communication tends to increase and sustain cooperation after it has been 
removed. However, other research finds that when communication is removed, there is 
a decrease in cooperation several trials after communication (Frolich and Oppenheimer 
1998). To illustrate, Voissem and Sistrunk (1971) find that communication before each 
trial of playing a two-person prisoner’s dilemma resulted in greater levels of cooperation 
compared to communication before every ten trials or just communication before the 
first trial. Moreover, Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) report a series of studies that 
suggest that one-shot communication initially increases cooperation, but then coopera-
tion may reduce after several trials, while repeated communication keeps cooperation 
rates exceptionally high. Again, a meta-analysis is able to resolve these conflicting findings.
Group size. Research on the communication-cooperation relationship also varies the 
size of group in the dilemma. It may be possible that group size will moderate the 
effect of communication on cooperation. To date, no published research has directly 
examined this question in an experimental setting. However, at least one unpublished 
paper has found that communication increases cooperation in smaller groups, com-
pared to larger groups, but only when communication is allowed before, and not 
during, the dilemma (Lubell et al. 2008). Observing any trends of the effect size across 
studies may provide a more powerful test exploring the moderating role of group size 
on the communication-cooperation effect size.
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Method
Locating Studies
Most studies were found using various academic databases (e.g., PsycINFO, Econlit). 
The search words included communication, discussion, cheap talk, cooperation, social 
dilemma, prisoner’s dilemma, commons dilemma, and public goods dilemma. Several 
studies were discovered by examining the citations in relevant review articles. Also, a 
few unpublished papers were found while searching the Internet. All attendees of the 
12th International Conference for Social Dilemmas were contacted and solicited for 
any unpublished manuscripts or data. All studies were found using these methods.
Criteria for Selection
Several criteria were applied for selection of studies. First, all studies must manipulate 
some form of communication between participants in a social dilemma. Studies that 
did not manipulate communication but measured communication and related this to 
cooperation were excluded. Second, all studies that failed to have an adequate control 
group were excluded. Studies were required to compare a communication condition 
with a noncommunication condition. This excluded a few studies that considered a 
different form of communication as a comparison group. Third, studies had to mea-
sure cooperation in a social dilemma. Any study with an outcome variable that could 
not be strictly considered a social dilemma, such as the dictator’s game, bargaining 
games, and trust games, were excluded. These criteria resulted in forty-five eligible 
effect sizes.
Coding Procedure
Type of communication: discussion versus writing. Most studies operationalize com-
munication as either a discussion among players or sending written messages either 
via computer or paper. All studies that involved a written message were coded 1 (n = 
12). Studies that allowed some form of discussion between participants were coded 2 
(n = 32). There was one study that included both written and verbal communication. 
This study will be excluded from the analysis examining the effect of this moderator 
variable. In both conditions, communication could have occurred before or during the 
dilemma.
Communication before versus during the dilemma. Of course, all studies manipulated 
communication prior to cooperation. However, in studies that include several trials, 
there is variation in the extent to which communication is allowed during the several 
trials. Studies that only allowed individuals to communicate prior to the first trial of the 
social dilemma were coded 1 (n = 17). These experiments asked participants to com-
municate for a set period prior to the dilemma and then restricted communication while 
participants were actually making their choice. On the other hand, studies that allowed 
ongoing communication during the dilemma were coded 2 (n = 28). The continued 
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communication could include either a structured form of communication prior to each 
trial (e.g., a choice of sending one of several prewritten messages) or simply allowing 
participants to discuss with each other at any time their strategies or choices.
Group size. In this sample of studies, the groups facing the dilemma varied in size, 
from two to nine persons. The mode of group size is two persons (n = 13). Group size 
was coded as a continuous variable.
Effect Size: Computation and Analysis
The standardized mean difference (d) value is the measure of effect size used in the 
current meta-analysis. The d value is commonly used to examine the effect size of 
two-level independent variables on continuous dependent variables. In our analysis, the 
reported effect sizes are the mean differences in cooperation between a control group 
(no communication, coded 1) and experimental group (communication condition, 
coded 2). Positive d values indicate greater levels of cooperation in the communication 
condition, relative to a no communication condition.
The effect size distribution does not contain all studies in the population of studies 
examining the relationship between communication and cooperation in social dilem-
mas. In fact, several relevant studies lacked the statistical information necessary to be 
included in the analysis. Because a fixed effects model assumes the effect size distri-
bution contains the entire population of studies, a mixed effects model is most 
appropriate for this analysis. A mixed effects model assumes that there is both system-
atic and random variation in the effect size distribution. Therefore, a random effects 
model is inappropriate, as this model assumes only random variation in the effect size 
distribution. However, one limitation of a mixed effects model, relative to fixed effects 
models, is that it may be too conservative and result in Type II errors (Lipsey and 
Wilson 2001). Therefore, any discrepancies between the results of a mixed effects 
model and fixed effects model will be reported.
All analyses adopt a Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) approach to meta-analysis, as this 
approach allows for the consideration of moderators. Analyses were conducted using 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software version 2.
Results
Analysis of Effect Size
The effect size and coding of each study is reported in Table 2. The results of the over-
all analysis demonstrate that the overall effect size distribution (n = 45) had greater 
variation than would be expected by chance alone, Q(44) = 282.9, p < .001. This sug-
gests that a mixed effects analysis is appropriate. Overall, communication had a 
significant large positive effect on cooperation in social dilemmas, d = 1.01, 95% 
confidence interval (CI), lower limit (LL) = 0.82, upper limit (UL) = 1.20.¹ Because 
most all studies included in the analysis are published studies, it may be that there is a 
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publication bias in the effect size distribution. Orwin’s (1983) fail-safe N is calculated, 
which estimates the total number of insignificant findings needed to reduce the esti-
mated average effect size to nonsignificant (d = .1). Orwin’s fail-safe N is 286. 
According to Hedges and Olkin (1985), to assure confidence in the results, Orwin’s 
fail-safe N should be five times the number of studies (here, 5 × 44 = 220), plus ten 
(220 + 10 = 230). Therefore, the current analysis seems robust against finding a 
number of unpublished nonsignificant findings.
There are a few outliers in the overall analysis. Two studies had exceptionally large 
effect sizes. Therefore, the estimated effect size is considered while removing these 
two studies from the overall analysis. Again, the effect size distribution demonstrated 
greater variation than would be expected by chance, Q(41) = 200.4, p < .001, and com-
munication had a significant large positive effect on cooperation, d = .92, 95% CI, LL = 
0.76, UL = 1.07. For this analysis, Orwin’s fail-safe N is 268. This analysis is also 
robust against finding several unpublished nonsignificant findings.
Moderator Analyses
Given that the distribution of effect size contained two outliers, the following modera-
tor analyses will be reported both with and without these outliers.2
Type of communication. Two types of communication were coded: talking and written 
messages. Overall, the effect of communication is stronger in the talk category, d = 
1.21, 95% CI, LL = 0.98, UL = 1.44, relative to the written message category, d = .46, 
95% CI, LL = 0.25, UL = 0.67, Q(1) = 22.35, p < .001. Without the outliers, the effect 
of communication is still stronger in the talk category, d = 1.07, 95% CI, LL = 0.89,
UL = 1.3, relative to the written message category, d = .46, 95% CI, LL = 0.25, UL = 
0.67, Q(1) = 18.56, p < .001.
Discussion before versus during the dilemma. While considering the relationship between 
communication before or during the dilemma in only the iterated games, there is no sta-
tistical difference between the impact of communication during the dilemma, d = 1.13, 
95% CI, LL = 0.83, UL = 1.43, relative to before the dilemma, d = .87, 95% CI, LL = 0.67, 
UL = 1.08, Q(1) = 1.92, p = .17. When excluding the outliers, communication during the 
dilemma, d = .95, 95% CI, LL = 0.72, UL = 1.19, is not statistically different than communi-
cation before the dilemma, d = .87, 95% CI, LL = 0.67, UL = 1.08, Q(1) = .24, p = .63.
Group size. Group size in the dilemma was coded as a continuous variable and used in 
a meta-regression as the predicting variable. Including the outliers, group size has a sig-
nificant positive relationship with the effect size, slope = .033, Z = 1.96, p = .05. When 
excluding the two outlier studies, group size had a marginally significant positive effect 
on the overall communication-cooperation effect size, slope = .032, Z = 1.87, p = .06.
Discussion
In this meta-analysis, communication had a strong positive effect on cooperation in a 
broad range of social dilemmas. Two moderating variables of that effect were identified. 
First, face-to-face discussion enhanced cooperation more than written messages. 
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Table 2. Studies Used in the Meta-Analysis
   MESS/ 
Study N DV TALK B/D G# OS/IT d
Betz (1991) 40 PD MESS D 2 IT 0.87
Bixenstine, Levitt, and Wilson (1966) 96 PD TALK D 6 IT 0.59
Bohnet and Frey (1999) 85 PD TALK D 4 O 0.87
Borenstein (1992) 180 IPD/IPG TALK B 6 O 1.76
Bouas and Komorita (1996) 160 GS TALK B 4 O 1.85
Braver and Wilson (1986) 126 GS TALK B 9 O 0.32
Brechner (1977) 72 TS TALK D 3 IT 0.70
Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann (2001) 40 GS TALK B 4 IT 2.53
Caldwell (1976) 50 PD TALK D 5 IT 1.67
Chen (1996) 256 GS TALK B 5 IT 0.99
Chen and Komorita (1994) 120 GS MESS D 5 IT 0.34
Clark, Kay, and Sefton (2001) 80 PD MESS D 2 IT 0.51
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) 284 TS TALK B 8 O 1.13
Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1988) 36 GS TALK B 9 O 1.14
Study 2 112 GS TALK B 7 O 0.89
Deutsch (1958) 270 PD MESS B 2 O 0.31
Deutsch (1960) 270 PD MESS B 2 O 0.27
Duffy and Feltovich (2002) 60 PD MESS D 2 IT 0.47
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) 85 PD TALK D 5 IT 8.37
Goren and Bornstein (2000) 120 IPD TALK D 6 IT 0.71
Isaac and Walker (1988) 40 GS TALK D 4 IT 1.61
Study 2 64 GS TALK D 8 IT 1.41
Jensen et al. (2008) 68 PD TALK D 2 IT 1.34
Jerdee and Rosen (1974) 100 PD TALK D 5 IT 0.73
Kerr et al. (1997) 173 GS TALK B 5 IT 0.70
Study 2 151 GS TALK B 5 IT 0.76
Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) 441 GS TALK B 5 IT 0.85
Kinukawa, Saijo, and Une (2000) 60 GS TALK D 6 IT 12.09
Liebrand (1984) 152 TS TALK D 6 IT 0.35
Marwell, Schmitt, and Shotoloa (1971) 40 O TALK D 2 IT 1.90
Mermin (1976) 190 PD TALK D 3 IT 1.24
Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) 512 GS TALK B 7 O 0.94
Ostram and Walker (1989) 64 GS TALK D 8 IT 3.46
Study 2 48 GS TALK D 8 IT 1.59
Polzer, Milton, and Gruenfeld (2009) 94 GS TALK B 6 IT 0.53
Study 2 57 GS TALK B 3 IT 0.71
Radlow and Weidner (1966) 64 GS MESS B 2 IT 1.10
Swingle and Santi (1972) 54 O MESS D 2 IT 1.48
Tazelaar, Van Lange, and Ouwerkerk (2004) 134 GS MESS D 2 IT 0.31
Study 2 94 GS MESS D 2 IT 0.66
Voissem and Sistrunk (1971) 96 PD MESS D 2 IT 0.62
Wichman (1970) 88 PD TALK D 3 IT 1.26
Wilson and Sell (1997) 144 GS MESS D 6 IT -0.14
Zheng et al. (2008) 67 GS MESS +  D 2 IT 1.07
     TALK
Zheng et al. (2009) 38 GS TALK D 2 IT 1.06
N = number of participants in study, GS = give-some game, TS = take-some game, PD = prisoner’s dilemma,
IPD = intergroup prisoner’s dilemma, O = other, TALK = allowed talking as form of communication, MESS = allowed written 
message as form of communication, B = allowed communication before the dilemma, D = allowed communication both 
before and during the dilemma, G# = group size in the dilemma, OS = one-shot dilemma, and IT = iterated dilemma.
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Second, the communication-cooperation relationship is stronger in larger, compared 
to smaller, group social dilemmas. Finally, repeated communication during iterated 
dilemmas did not have a statistically larger communication-cooperation effect size, 
compared to only pregame communication. These findings have several practical and 
theoretical implications.
Communication Medium
Today, much communication is computer-mediated. We often find ourselves maintain-
ing contact with colleagues, family, and friends via the Internet. Even communication 
that sustains international relations may occur online or via written messages. These 
ongoing relationships are certainly not immune to encountering social dilemmas. If a 
colleague of a current project is not responding to emails or is perceived to not be engag-
ing effort into a specific project, these actions may be construed as free-riding on others’ 
contribution to the project. In this case, should a frustrated collaborator send another 
message via email or should the collaborators meet and talk about the problem? The 
current findings suggest that talking about the problems will facilitate greater coordina-
tion of efforts and enhance cooperation. Indeed, face-to-face discussion in a social 
dilemma increased cooperation more than written messages. There are several reasons 
why this may occur.
First, face-to-face communication is more dynamic and fluid than electronic 
computer-mediated communication and allows individuals to more accurately address 
the important issues and concerns raised in social dilemmas. In face-to-face discus-
sions there are more salient norms and rules of communication that allow issues to be 
addressed more accurately and effectively, for example, sequential discussion. An 
individual can raise a concern or idea and expect the other to address those thoughts. 
However, many forms of computer-mediated communication do not follow these 
norms of discussion. Therefore, some concerns of individuals may not be addressed 
by others in the group and this may inhibit the formation of cooperative relationships. 
Second, other social cues, such as eye gaze, sound, and touch, are often unavailable in 
written messages or communicating via the computer. These subtle cues might com-
municate the sincerity of others’ commitments in the dilemma (Bicchieri and Lev-On 
2007). Indeed, only being able to see the other in the dilemma tends to increase coop-
erative behavior (Boone, Declerck, and Suetens 2008; Kurzban 2001; Wichman 1970). 
However, Wichman (1970) found while only hearing the other can raise cooperation 
to levels observed in conditions when individuals are able to both see and hear the 
other, simply seeing the other only slightly increases cooperation relative to a control 
condition. These studies suggest that certain cues are being subtly sent when individu-
als are able to nonverbally communicate with each other that is not being captured in 
written message or some forms of computer-mediated communication.
A third possibility is that face-to-face discussion, compared to written communica-
tion, is more likely to activate the social norm of promise keeping, which would 
subsequently increase levels of cooperation (Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007). Bicchieri 
(2002) proposes that the effects of discussion on cooperation in social dilemmas can 
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be explained by the presence of the social norm of promise keeping. This social norm 
is a rule that individuals use to direct their behavior in specific situations. Bicchieri 
states that this norm directs behavior only when people expect others to cooperate in 
the dilemma. Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) suggest that the social norm of promise 
keeping is more salient in face-to-face discussions, relative to computer-mediated 
communication, which lacks some of the situational features that make salient the 
norm of promise keeping. For example, computer-mediated interactions provide few 
social cues that can be used to evaluate the credibility of others’ promises. They also 
indicate a lack of leadership in online communication as an important difference that 
can affect the norm of promise keeping. In line with this perspective, Orbell, van de 
Kragt, and Dawes (1988) noticed that groups with strong leaders resulted in a greater 
number of promises to cooperate and this actually resulted in greater levels of coop-
eration. Clearly there is a need for more research that systematically explores the 
different communication mediums and their effects on cooperation. This research will 
undoubtedly contribute to our understanding of why communication matters and will 
result in practical solutions to enhancing the effectiveness of communication.
One salient practical implication of these current findings addresses the complica-
tions of communication in long distance relationships. For example, when several 
individuals or groups are interacting via long distance, such as the UN or multinational 
organizations, it is important that communication occurs face to face, compared to 
emails or written messages, to discuss efforts and contributions toward superordinate 
goals. In the absence of face-to-face discussion there might be a collapse in effort by 
particular members and this may spread to reduce the effort by others. However, it 
might be of concern that face-to-face discussions are costly, time-consuming, and, if 
international, promote pollution of the environment through more extensive air travel. 
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1994) find that the cost of communication can pose a 
second-order public goods dilemma. It’s in each individual’s self-interest not to pay 
for communication but to enjoy its benefits, but if everyone fails to pay for communi-
cation, then this doesn’t occur and no one enjoys the rewards of communication. One 
effective way of resolving this second-order dilemma is identifying less costly forms 
of communication. Importantly, at least one study has demonstrated that a video con-
ference is as effective as face-to-face discussion in facilitating cooperation (Brosig, 
Ockenfels, and Weimann 2001). Also, Jensen et al. (2008) find that communication 
over the phone increases cooperation more than both text chat and no communication, 
but this communication medium was not compared to face-to-face interactions. 
Therefore, two less costly communication mediums, video conference and the 
telephone, which are found to increase cooperation more than written messages, may 
be considered while sustaining discussion in ongoing dilemmas for multinational 
organizations.
Pregame Versus Continuous Communication
This meta-analysis did not find support for the hypothesis that when individuals are 
engaged in an iterated social dilemma, then continuous communication is more 
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effective at increasing cooperation relative to just preplay communication. Earlier 
research has resulted in mixed findings on this topic. While some studies show that 
communication before several iterated trials of a dilemma results in sustained coop-
eration after communication is removed (Brosig, Ockenfels, and Weimann 2001; 
Radlow and Weidner 1966), other studies find that after communication is removed, 
then there is a decrease in cooperation (Frolich and Oppenheimer 1998), especially 
compared to a continued communication condition (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; 
Voissem and Sistrunk 1971). The current results bolster the findings that communica-
tion can have a sustained effect on cooperation after it has been removed. Indeed, 
while only considering the iterated dilemma studies, there was no statistical difference 
between when the discussion occurred, either before or during the dilemma, in the 
communication-cooperation effect size. It might be that communication prior to the 
social dilemma generates a personal norm of cooperation (Kerr et al. 1997) or a social 
norm of promise keeping (Bicchieri 2002), which may subsequently increase propen-
sities to cooperate even in the absence of communication or oversight from others. 
Jerdee and Rosen (1974) observed higher levels of cooperation while communication 
was allowed during the dilemma and suggest that it was due to individuals sending 
“counter reinforcers,” such as social approval or disapproval. Similarly, other research-
ers have noted that participants often communicate disapproval of others’ defection in 
dilemmas and that this may potentially explain the effectiveness of communication 
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998; Ostrom and Walker 1988). However, the current 
results suggest that it is not necessary for others in social dilemmas to send “counter 
reinforcers,” such as praise or disapproval, in response to a partner’s cooperation or 
defection, respectively. Alternatively, after communication, individuals might have 
greater anticipated positive and negative emotions in response to thoughts of coopera-
tion and defection. It might be that the norms mentioned previously are in part 
sustained and influence behavior because of their effect on anticipated emotions. 
Indeed, Miettinen and Suetens (2008) recently found that individuals experienced more 
guilt in response to their defections when these defections were unilateral and occurred 
after a mutual agreement to cooperate. As these researchers mention, communication 
might establish a prosocial norm that subsequently affects anticipated guilt regarding a 
choice to defect. Future research exploring the communication-cooperation relation-
ship will benefit by examining the effect of communication on both anticipated and 
experienced emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, anger, gratitude, and joy) in response to both 
own and other’s cooperation and defection. Beyond simply provoking several theo-
retical questions, these findings have some exciting practical solutions to effectively 
dealing with iterated social dilemmas.
These results have several positive implications for individuals and groups in 
sustained relationships that repeatedly encounter social dilemmas. For example, com-
munication is costly for many international organizations or groups that interact 
repeatedly while facing social dilemmas. These findings suggest that repeated com-
munication may not be necessary while engaged in any one particular organizational 
project. Therefore, international organizations may be able to establish one face-
to-face meeting prior to the beginning of any single project and then might consider 
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sustaining communication on project progress via email or other forms of less costly 
and time-consuming forms of communication.
While promoting this finding, it is important to note that there are some limitations 
in the current analysis to test this relationship. The effect might only occur for studies 
that include several iterations, perhaps more iterations than what were captured in 
most studies in this meta-analysis. The mode of iterations in the current sample of 
studies is 10 iterations (n = 15). However, there were several studies that observed 
behavior in more than 10 iterations (n = 18), and these studies ranged from 12 to 101 
iterations. Conducting the same analysis on only the 10 plus iteration studies still fails 
to find a statistical moderation effect. However, this analysis suffers low power and 
might be at risk of resulting in a Type II error. Future meta-analyses that have a greater 
range of iterated studies will be in a better position to examine this relationship.
Group Size, Communication, and Cooperation
Group size has a positive effect on the communication-cooperation relationship. As 
group size increased, communication becomes more effective at enhancing coopera-
tion, relative to a no communication condition. Why does group size moderate this 
relationship? I speculate on two explanations. First, it is well known that as group size 
increases, cooperation declines (Hamburger, Guyer, and Fox 1975; Olson 1965). It is 
possible that group size reduces cooperation in the no communication condition, but 
communication buffers the negative effect of group size and retains levels of coopera-
tion in the communication condition similar to those observed in communication 
conditions with small groups. One explanation for reduced cooperation in larger groups 
is a lower perceived sense of individual and collective self-efficacy (Kerr 1989). Per-
haps communication enhances an individual’s perceived self-efficacy. Similarly, 
during communication if all or most participants promise to cooperate, then an indi-
vidual may sense that their contribution is critical to attaining the public good (van de 
Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes 1983). While dilemmas research implicates self-efficacy 
and perceived criticalness as potential proximate mechanisms underlying this relation-
ship, an alternative theory speculates on possible distal causes.
Evolution and costly signaling theory provide an alternative account of this rela-
tionship. From this perspective, individuals would be more inclined to express their 
willingness to cooperate in group discussion and to actually cooperate more as the 
group size increases (Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). In short, these authors argue that 
in the evolution of our species, there was likely selective pressure for an adaptation to 
discriminate among contexts that provide the opportunity to send “efficient” signals 
that a person is generous and a good relationship partner. One way to improve effi-
ciency in signaling is for an individual to only signal to others their generosity when a 
large number of potential receivers are present. If this is correct, then individuals 
would be more inclined to make explicit commitment to cooperate during larger, com-
pared to smaller, group discussions prior to the dilemma. When there are a greater 
number of commitments or promises from group members, then the individuals in that 
group are more likely to cooperate (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988). Future 
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research examining the costly signaling perspective might consider how group size inter-
acts with communication to predict the likelihood of expressing commitments of 
contributing to the public good and how continued communication affects the prom-
ise-behavior relationship. The present findings certainly give credibility to further 
study of the interaction between group size and communication predicting 
cooperation.
There is, however, a limitation in the current meta-analysis examining the effect of 
group size. The mode of studies included in this analysis is a two-person interaction 
(30 percent of the studies). The largest group sizes were two studies including nine-
person groups. Therefore, the studies included in this analysis may not have had 
enough larger groups to really provide a strong test of the overall interaction. Future 
research on the communication and group size interaction predicting cooperation in 
social dilemmas will benefit by observing behavior in larger group contexts.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are a few limitations to the current meta-analysis worth noting. First, there were 
a few outliers in the data set. In these studies there was almost unanimous defection in 
the noncommunication condition and unanimous cooperation in the communication 
condition. These studies certainly demonstrate the power of communication in social 
dilemmas. However, they may also strongly influence the moderator analyses and 
potentially bias the estimate of the overall effect size. All analyses were reported with 
and without these outliers to make clear any significant discrepancies in the interpreta-
tions of these analyses. Future meta-analyses, which will include more effect sizes, will 
be in a better position to handle the influence of these outliers. Second, as is usual in 
meta-analyses, there were several studies that were unable to be included due to a lack 
of required statistical information. Third, this study didn’t include the few studies that 
measured, and so did not manipulate, communication. The analysis was limited to 
studies that only compared communication to a highly controlled noncommunication 
condition. Fourth, there were not enough studies to examine several other possible 
moderating variables, such as type of dilemma, the index of cooperation in the 
dilemma, and the percentage of prosocials in the dilemma. For example, I was inter-
ested in examining if communication would be more effective in prisoner’s dilemmas 
with greater conflict between individual and collective outcomes (Boone, Declerck, 
and Suetens 2008). Rapoport’s (1967) index of cooperation (k value) conveniently 
quantifies this level of conflict on a value ranging from 0 to 1. However, there were 
too few studies that permitted calculation of this value. Future meta-analyses may be 
in a better position to consider these other possible moderators.
Conclusion
One of the earliest findings in the social dilemma literature is that communication 
enhances cooperation. The current meta-analysis confirms these earlier findings and 
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John Dewey’s idea that there is a meaningful relationship between communication and 
community. Indeed, communication has a strong positive effect on cooperation in social 
dilemmas. However, this effect is moderated by aspects of the study design, such as 
group size and communication medium. Future research exploring the several possible 
explanations for these findings will make notable contributions to understanding the 
communication-cooperation relationship and the development of solutions to the per-
vasive problems posed by social dilemmas.
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Notes
1. The overall effect size can also be reported as a correlation, r = .49, 95% confidence interval 
(CI) LL = .40, UL = .57.
2. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) and Kinukawa, Saijo, and Une (2000) report effect sizes, 
d = 8.37 and d =12.09, respectively, that are outliers in the current distribution of effect 
sizes. Each study has a communication condition where participants are allowed to discuss 
in groups of five or six people their strategy during a paid iterated dilemma. They each have 
relatively low sample sizes, eighty-five and sixty, respectively. In both studies, the com-
munication condition resulted in almost unanimous cooperation with exceptionally small 
amounts of variation. Also, in both studies, the no-communication conditions resulted in 
very little cooperation.
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